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INTRODUCTION
Jury trials are under siege. Detractors claim that in our increasingly
complicated society, the lay jury is an outmoded vehicle for realizing
trial justice. Jury incompetence, they say, leads to unjust results, leav-
ing suspect the legitimacy of trial by jury. Typical is the criticism of
historian Carl Becker: "Trial by jury, as a method of determining
facts, is antiquated and inherently absurd-so much so that no lawyer,
judge, scholar, prescription-clerk, cook, or mechanic in a garage would
ever think for a moment of employing that method for determining
the facts in any situation that concerned him."' But juries are most
frequently criticized for lacking the wherewithal to comprehend the
law and facts of certain complex cases. It is here that jurors most com-
monly confront lengthy, complicated and highly technical fact
situations. 2
This Article reevaluates and refines a proposed remedy for this
shortcoming: requiring a minimum number of college-educated indi-
viduals on juries trying complex cases. Part I particularizes the major
problems jurors commonly incur in complex cases. Part II reviews
earlier proposals for highly educated and other specially qualified ju-
rors, and discusses the germane constitutional issues. Part III exam-
ines the related results of a large scale survey of Los Angeles jurors,
which provide valuable insight into differences in the perceptions of
college-educated versus non-college-educated jurors. Part IV offers
suggestions for implementing the educated jury proposal.
1. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 124 (1949).
2. Much legal discussion of jury comprehension in complex litigation emanates from the de-
bate over whether there is or should be a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment right
of jury trial. For a discussion of the issue, see generally Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial in Complex
Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43 (1980)
(reviewing English jury practices generally in the late eighteenth century); William V. Luneberg
& Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives
for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REV. 887 (1981) (propos-
ing two alternatives to current jury practices); see also Douglas King, Complex Civil Litigation
and the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 581 (1984) (discussing the
appropriateness of juries in modem-day complex cases by comparing such cases with "suits at
common law" at the time of the Seventh Amendment); Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment
Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U. L. REV.
486, 504-05 (1975) (discussing the issue of jury competency in complex cases).
[Vol. 47:49
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I. COMPLEX TRIALS AND LAY JURIES
A. Juror Limitations
Many of the sharpest criticisms of jury performance in complex
cases emanate from the judiciary.3 One of the most prominent critics
was former Chief Justice Warren Burger, who voiced profound skepti-
cism of juror ability to comprehend and decide the complex issues of
many cases.4 Others echo the critique. 5 Considerable research sup-
ports this charge, indicating, for example, that jurors lack adequate
memories for recalling trial testimony and have difficulty making deci-
sions based on statistical or probabilistic information. 6 In their book
on jury performance, Selvin and Picus explain some of the reasons
why jury performance in complex cases is suspect:
Psychological theory indicates that when presented with complex
information on a great number of facts, individuals generally per-
ceive one or a few generalizations that summarize and provide
meaning for the information rather than the specific details. As a
result, memory is "reconstructive," people recall the general im-
pression of an event or the information presented along with some
of the details.7
A related charge is of jurors' inability to comprehend a judge's in-
structions, especially the final instructions on the law to be applied in
arriving at a verdict. The task of comprehending and applying the
judge's instructions constitutes a critical interface between community
standards, as represented by the views of the jurors and the accumu-
lated statutory and common law, with all its nuances, subtleties and
idiomatic jargon. Albeit consuming a relatively small part of the
jury's time of service, the significance of this process cannot be over-
emphasized. The very legitimacy of the jury system is inextricably tied
to the successful devolution of the law's administration from the
3. Judge Jerome Frank charged that "while the jury can contribute nothing of value so far as
the law is concerned, it has infinite capacity for mischief, for twelve men can easily misunder-
stand more law in a minute than the judge can explain in an hour." Skidmore v. Baltimore &
O.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1948).
4. See Warren E. Burger, Agenda for Change, 54 JUDIcATuRE 232, 235 (1971) (contrasting
British system of trying complex civil suits before experts instead of lay jurors); Warren E. Bur-
ger, The Use of Lay Jurors in Complicated Civil Cases, Remarks to the Conference of State Chief
Justices 3-5 (Aug. 7, 1979) (asserting that lay jurors cannot comprehend technical evidence).
5. See, e.g., Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARV. L. REV. 898
(1979); see also Douglas W. Ell, Comment, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: Protracted Com-
mercial Litigation and the Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L REV. 775, 775-87 (1978).
6. MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY PICUS, THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE: OBSERVA-
TIONS FROM A RECENT ASBESTOS CASE 45-46 (1987).
7. Id. The jury's collective understanding and memory may be better than most individual
jurors, especially when enhanced by jury room discussion. It has been demonstrated, however,
that in terms of understanding, juries rarely perform up to the ability of their best member. Id.
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bench to the jury. All the received wisdom of the ages contained in
the law is to no avail if the jury cannot understand the judge's instruc-
tions. Nonetheless, understanding the law is often the most difficult
task for the juror; legal instructions can be extraordinarily complex
and/or long.
Critics see this as a problem endemic to the lay jury system.8 Cen-
tral to the problem are these corollary paradoxes:
a) The law seeks the benefit of the common person's judgment
but asks that individual to apply legal rules often beyond the
comprehension of one not trained in the law; and
b) the simpler and more intelligible the instructions, the more
likely they will miss or inadequately state a relevant point of
law, thereby creating grounds for appellate reversal.
How well do jurors comprehend the instructions? To answer this
question, we must put current practice into historical perspective.
Prior to the 1895 Supreme Court decision, Sparf and Hansen v. United
States,9 juries decided issues of law as well as fact. Sparf created the
obligation of judges to communicate the law, and juries to follow it,
via jury instructions. 10 Legal chaos ensued. Each set of instructions
bore the vagaries and often unintelligible idiosyncracies of the in-
structing judge. Federal Judge Jerome Frank, one-time chairman of
the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") and oft-quoted critic of
the jury system, decried the situation:
What a crop of subsidiary semi-myths and mythical practices thejury system yields! Time and money and lives are consumed in de-
bating the precise words the judge may address to the jury, although
everyone who stops to see and think knows that these words might
as well be spoken in a foreign language-that, indeed, for all the
jury's understanding of them, they are spoken in a foreign language.
Yet, every day, cases which have taken weeks to try are reversed by
upper courts because a phrase or sentence, meaningless to the jury,
has been included in, or omitted from the judge's charge
[instructions]."
As waxing numbers of verdicts were reversed on appeal due to
faulty instructions, the solution chosen was the adoption of standard-
ized "pattern" instructions. In 1938, a committee of California judges
8. See MARCUS GLEISSER, JURIES AND JUSTICE 228-31 (1968); WILLIAM O'BARR, LNGuIsTIc
EVIDENCE 17-18 (1982); Amiram Elwork et. al., The Trial: A Research Review, in TiH TRIAL
PROCESS 34-36 (Bruce D. Sales ed., 1981).
9. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
10. See id.
11. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 181 (1930).
[Vol. 47:49
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and lawyers published the Book of Approved Jury Instructions.12 By
1980, thirty-nine states had adopted some such version of pattern
instructions. 13 Impelled by the desire to avoid appellate reversal, pat-
tern instructions nevertheless sacrificed clarity, simplicity and, most
importantly, comprehensibility. Pattern instructions create four
problems for jurors. First, they are usually replete with legal jargon
and esoteric words. Second, the language tends to be abstract instead
of concrete. Third, sentences are often lengthy, complex and gram-
matically constructed in the most confounding way, rife with
subordinate clauses and double negatives. Finally, they are not
presented in an organized way.
A highly regarded series of studies by Elwork, Sales and Altfini
tested the comprehensibility of pattern instructions. 14 The subjects
were divided into three groups.15 The first group received the stan-
dard Michigan pattern instructions on negligence; the second received
a version rewritten to improve comprehensibility; and the third group
received no instructions at all. 16 The results confirmed the fears of
critics. Pattern jury instructions were about as effective in helping ju-
rors understand the law as no instructions at all. Moreover, the group
receiving pattern instructions made far more clear mistakes of law di-
rectly impairing the accuracy of their verdicts.' 7 That part of the neg-
ligence instructions relating to plaintiff's contributory negligence was
ignored, rendering their findings incompatible with a verdict for the
plaintiff.18 Pattern-instructed jurors were also more prone to discuss
legally inadmissible evidence, such as whether the defendant or the
insurance company would pay the award.19 Conversely, performance
significantly improved in the group receiving the rewritten
instructions.20
Other research confirms the appallingly low levels at which jurors
comprehend instructions. Studies in six states place the level of com-
12. See COMMITEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS (8th ed. 1994).
13. Amiram Elwork et al., Toward Understandable Jury Instructions, 65 JUDICATURE 433 n.3
(1982) (citations omitted).
14. Amiram Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, 1 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 163 (1977).
15. Id. at 169-71.
16. Id
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
1997]
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prehension at below fifty percent.2' Inaccurate verdicts due to incom-
prehensible instructions translate to gross miscarriages of justice. A
disturbing illustration occurred in Washington, D.C., where a jury mis-
understood the judge's instructions and found a defendant guilty when
it really meant to free him.22
One particular problem implicates the growing incidence of expert
testimony in complex cases. Studies show that juries attach great
weight to such testimony.23 Yet an especially perplexing task for lay
jurors is to assimilate and select, in some rational manner, from the
competing testimonies of expert witnesses. This "battle of the ex-
perts" tends to confound juries. Moreover, it creates obvious poten-
tial for corruption of jury decision-making because of the jury's
ignorance and naivet6. An advantage lies with the party whose expert
has the most persuasive forensic skills rather than the most authorita-
tive and meritorious testimony.
In short, jury trials involving complex or highly technical facts or
legal issues can present a fundamental problem of decision-maker
competence. A basic assumption of the law has been that the jury can
understand the case presented to it. In a case involving complex ap-
plication of antitrust law, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals said,
"The law presumes that a jury will find facts and reach a verdict by
rational means. It does not contemplate scientific precision but does
contemplate a resolution of each issue on the basis of a fair and rea-
sonable assessment of the evidence. '2 4 Complex cases going to a jury
may undermine this predicate of a just trial.
21. Amiram Elwork & Bruce D. Sales, Jury Instructions, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE
AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 280, 283 (Saul Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985).
22. A Newsweek article recounts the story:
The case turned on the fate of Andre Sellars, charged with the murder of an acquain-
tance, one Epluribus Thomas, during a fight in a grocery-store parking lot. Sellars
pleaded self-defense. The jury listened carefully to evidence that Epluribus and his
brother Clyde had threatened Sellar's life through a whole weekend of arguments.
When testimony ended, the jury heard a whole half-hour's worth of [judicial] instruc-
tions couched in classic legalese.... After deliberating overnight, the nine women and
three men announced that they had found Sellars guilty-not of second degree murder
as he was charged, but of manslaughter.
Later, chatting in the jury lounge, several of the jurors discovered that they had really
meant to find Sellars innocent, but had misunderstood the judge's instructions. They
knew that Sellars had killed Thomas, and thought that if they accepted Sellar's self-
defense plea, manslaughter was the appropriate verdict.
Guilty, I Mean Innocent, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 20, 1975, at 64 (noting that the rule against double
jeopardy barred another murder trial for Sellars; the jury's error left open the possibility of a
retrial for manslaughter).
23. Allan Raitz et al., Determining Damages: The Influence of Expert Testimony on Jurors'
Decision Making, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 385, 393 (1990).
24. Matsushita Electric Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Co., 631 F.2d 1069, 1073 (3rd Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 47:49
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B. Empirical Evidence of Lay Jury Incompetence in Complex Cases
Several studies buttress the contention of lay jury incompetence in
complex cases.25 Notably troublesome for lay juries in such' cases is
the untoward effect of adversarial presentation of evidence. In their
study of asbesteosis litigation, for example, Selvin and Picus found
that the adversarial presentation of complex technical testimony mis-
led jurors regarding the development of the disease.26 Other studies
show jurors will rely on misleading and fallacious arguments of statis-
tical interpretation, depending on the method the attorneys choose to
present the statistical information.27 These findings suggest that the
self-interested presentation of complex technical testimony jeopar-
dizes jury comprehension. A common illustration of the problem is
that of jurors attempting to evaluate the conflicting testimonies of op-
posing expert witnesses. Studies document jurors' struggles with such
evidence.28 As a result, jurors may underutilize or even ignore expert
testimony.29 Conversely, some commentators argue that jurors over-
emphasize expert testimony.30
The artifacts of modernity bring a mixed blessing. Technical and
scientific advances expand our knowledge, improve our standard of
living and facilitate the realization of our potential. By the same to-
ken, the increasing complexity of litigated disputes produces an ever-
25. Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication:
Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc. REV. 123, 149 (1980-81) (describing errors in judgment result-
ing from faulty heuristics people tend to use in order to integrate complex information); Selvin
& Picus, supra note 6, at 45-46 (studying jury competence of medical and other evidence in
asbestos litigation); William C. Thompson, Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical Evi-
dence?, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB., Autumn 1989, at 9,24-41 (citing the different types of errors
jurors make in interpreting statistical evidence); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Preci-
sion and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1334 (1971) (arguing that layper-
sons overemphasize mathematical evidence); Jury Competence in Complex Cases, A.B.A.
SPECIAL COMM. OF JURY COMPREHENSION 25 (1989) [hereinafter, ABA REPORT] (investigating
jury functioning in four complex cases).
26. SELVIN & Picus, supra note 6, at 24. The misconception apparently resulted from incom-
plete medical testimony. Id. at 24-25.
27. See William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in
Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense Attorney's Fallacy, 11 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 167, 175-76 (1987).
28. See MICHAEL J. SAKS & R. VAN DUizEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN LITIGA-
TON 9 (1983) (citing problems of "incompetent, incomprehensible, or dishonest" experts); Jane
Goodman, Edith Greene & F. Loftus, What Confuses Jurors in Complex Cases: Judges and Ju-
rors Outline the Problems, TRIAL, Nov. 1988, at 65-66, 69; see also Michael J. Saks, Expert Wit-
nesses, Nonexpert Witnesses, and Nonwitness Experts, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291, 299-302
(1990) (discussing the general problems of reliance on expert testimony, much of which is
unreliable).
29. David L. Faigmen & A.J. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes Theorem in the Trial Process, 12 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 1, 13 (1988); Saks & Kidd, supra note 25, at 148-49.
30. See Tribe, supra note 25, at 1334.
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growing number of cases whose factual and legal issues are beyond
the ken of the average juror. Expert testimony, intended to inform
and clarify the evidence in complex cases, instead often further con-
fuses juries. In his review of complex cases, University of Michigan
law professor Richard Lempert writes, "One may conclude from look-
ing at these cases that with some frequency trials confront jurors with
evidence that only experts have no difficulty understanding. More-
over, even where the evidence should be comprehensible to a jury,
jurors chosen in a particular case may not comprehend."'31
C. The Lawyer Factor
Another important but less chronicled set of cognate problems in-
heres in the lay jury's reaction to the attorneys. Specifically, how sus-
ceptible are jurors to attorney manipulation? Are jury verdicts
affected when there is a mismatch of skills between the opposing at-
torneys? Logic suggests that the more simple and straightforward the
factual and legal issues of the case, the less likely that lawyering skills
will prevail over the merits of the case. Increasing complexity, on the
other hand, allows the crafty tactician greater room to ply his or her
skills decisively. The strong inference, then, is that this "lawyer fac-
tor" in jury trial outcomes is far more prevalent in complex cases.
Under the adversary system of trial procedure, attorneys are given
broad latitude in the courtroom. When the evidentiary facts or appo-
site law of a case are adverse to a client's interests, the attorney's
courtroom skills in swaying the jury come to the fore. The attorney
may distort or dissemble the facts. He or she may use highly charged
argumentation, even histrionics, to appeal to the jurors' emotions.
The attorney may distract the jury during an opponent's questioning
of witnesses or may even ferociously attack the credibility of a hostile
witness whom the attorney knows to be telling the truth. Comment-
ing on juror receptivity to emotive attorney suasion, one writer
observed:
So it is that the experienced lawyer, knowing well this weakness,
passes lightly over facts he would have stressed before a judge
alone, and instead puts his emphasis on the dramatic aspects of his
case. Here is where the orator takes over and leaves the lawyer
behind: he knows that each juror is influenced by his own back-
ground, training and heredity; that the listener, as in all audiences,
can be led about by his emotions and prejudices. So the lawyer hits
these hard. He puts aside his professional desire for objectivity in
31. Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries in Complex Cases: Taking Stock after Twelve Years, in
VERDICr. ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181, 191 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
[Vol. 47:49
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justice and instead attempts to capitalize upon the whimsical ex-
cesses that juries are known for .... These very emotions which a
lawyer tries to grasp firmly are a major obstacle in the way of a jury
sincerely seeking to find the facts about a case before it.32
Instances of attorney guile succeeding in contravention of the ap-
parent merits of a case are legion. When this occurs, the fault lies not
with the individual attorneys who employ morally or ethically ques-
tionable practices, but with the trial system which permits their use.
The lawyer's professional duty behooves him or her to make the best
possible use of the jurors' emotions. Notwithstanding this, trial and
appellate courts routinely overlook all but the most inflammatory
practices. 33 Courts have not only held that the shedding of attorney
tears is permissible, for instance, but have even suggested it was the
attorney's duty to do so under proper circumstances. 34
The availability of a plethora of trial tactics is one thing; skill in
their use is another. Trial attorney skills vary wildly. Some attorneys
are incompetent or barely competent; others use their repertoire of
trial tactics and stratagems to command six or seven figure fees. As
the disparity in opposing attorney skills in a given trial widens, the
more likely that the merits of the case will fall into the breach. In-
deed, even in theory the adversary system works optimally only when
the opposing attorneys are of roughly equal competence. 35
A potential problem arises in the many trials where the opposing
attorneys are significantly mismatched. The disparity in the skills of
the opposing attorneys may affect or singularly determine the jury's
decision. This disparity may be due to anything from superior prepa-
ration, to one attorney simply ingratiating him or herself with the jury
more than the opposing attorney does-the so-called "likability fac-
tor."' 36 Simply put, juries sometimes try the attorneys, not the case. In
that situation, trial justice is denied or, at best, serendipitous. When-
ever mismatched attorney skills dictate the outcome, there looms the
spectre of style bestriding substance, and the triumph of lawyering
over justice.
32. GLEISSER, supra note 8, at 253-54.
33. FRANKLIN STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTIcE: AN AGENDA FOR TRIAL REFORM 14-15,
83-84, 166-68 (1996).
34. Ferguson v. Moore, 39 S.W. 341, 342 (Tenn. 1897).
35. EDWARD M. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYS-
TEM OF LITiGATiON 34 (1956).
36. See FRANK, supra note 1, at 121.
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II. SPECIALLY QUALIFIED JURIES AND THE EDUCATED
JURY PROPOSAL
A. Proposed Solutions: Specially Qualified Juries in General
The specially qualified jury is not a recent concept. At the incep-
tion of the modern jury, all juries were special in that they were pur-
posely chosen for their special knowledge of the facts in dispute. 37
Later on, special juries of merchants, selected for their expertise on
trade customs, helped develop the precepts of English commercial
law.38 In the United States, special "blue ribbon" juries were common
in the first half of the twentieth century,39 but fell into desuetude
thereafter. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court upheld
New York's special jury selection process in Fay v. New York.40 Dela-
ware revived the special jury in 1988 for use in complex cases only.41
Although the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on its con-
stitutionality, A similar statute was upheld under both state and federal
constitutions by the highest court in Delaware.4 2
Jury decision-making would likely be improved, where most
needed, by using specially qualified jurors. In complex litigation, the
jury could be limited to individuals with superior potential for com-
prehending the evidence and instructions. The judge or the parties
could be authorized to select from the venire those with the most rele-
vant experience or education, subject only to challenges for cause. Al-
ternatively, the judge could be authorized to establish minimum
standards, e.g., a college degree, for service on the case.43
Greater use could also be made of court-appointed special masters
or other experts for fact-finding in complex cases. The experts would
either report to or supplant the jury.44 The objection to using special
masters or any specially selected external expert body is that it
37. James C. Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 137, 164 (1983).
38. Id. at 173-74.
39. See Richard C. Baker, In Defense of the 'Blue Ribbon' Jury, 35 IOWA L. REv. 409, 410
(1950).
40. 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
41. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4506 (Supp. 1996).
42. Nance v. Rees, 161 A.2d 795, 803 (Del. 1960).
43. Luneberg & Nordenberg, supra note 2, at 900, 942-50; see also Dan Drazan, The Case for
Special Juries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 72 JUDICATURE 292, 296-97 (1989); Peter Huber, Junk
Science and the Jury, 1990 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 301.
44. Some have even suggested establishment of a "science court." Actually a board of scien-
tists, the science court would be used for certain kinds of scientific factfinding. Expert case
managers from each side of a controversy would argue their positions before a three-member
board. The board would supplement, not replace, the jury. The board's report is made to the
court. Howard T. Markey, A Forum for Technocracy: A Report on the Science Court Proposal,
60 JUDICATURE 365, 367 (1977).
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removes fact-finding from the jury; whereas even specially qualified
jurors would retain the random process by which the original venire is
selected. Random selection is intended to provide a representative
cross-section of the community in the venire. But no jury-selection
statute or court decision prohibits modification of the venire so
selected.
One might question whether expertise or other special qualities are
necessary or even desirable in complex cases. Consider the opinions
of a majority of federal and state trial judges in a nationwide Harris
survey.4 5 They agreed on these statements regarding complex civil
cases:
" A serious study should be made of alternatives to jury trial.46
" Jurors need more guidance than they usually get.47
" It is difficult for jurors with different educational levels to be
effective.48
" Trial before a panel of experts would be preferable to jury trial
(emphasis supplied). 49
B. The Educated Jury Proposal
A particular kind of specially qualified jury proposed for use in
complex civil cases is one requiring some or all of the jurors to hold a
college degree.50 The major premise of the educated jury proposal is
utility: All other factors being equal, the knowledge, discipline and
cultivated intellect gained from a college education should render one
better equipped to execute the juror's fact-finding and application-of-
law tasks. This is not elitism; it is merely functionalism.
45. Lou Harris & Associates, Inc., Judges' Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State-
and Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L.
Rev. 731, 747 (1989).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 748.
48. Id
49. Id. Additionally, in this study Harris found that substantial minorities of the federal
judges (39%) and state judges (31%) felt that in complex cases there should be a minimum level
of juror education to avoid those who cannot understand the case. Id.
50. Others have advanced this proposal before, most notably Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries
and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MIcH. L. REV. 68, 117-21 (1981); Luneberg
& Nordenberg, supra note 2, at 900, 947-51; William Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 132
F.R.D. 575, 580-81 (1991). Although most technically complex cases are civil, there is no reason
to distinguish them from equally difficult criminal cases. For an illustrative discussion of the
jury's confusion over medical and legal terminology which led to a mistrial of the last McMartin
Preschool criminal molestation case, see Carol McGraw, In the End, Jury Gave in to Confusion,
L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1990, at 1, 30.
1997]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:49
The hypothesized superiority of college-educated jurors flows from
the following assumptions. First, during evidence presentation, col-
lege-educated jurors should generally fare better than their lesser edu-
cated counterparts at grasping the evidence in complex litigation. A
presumed corollary is that decisions would be influenced more by the
merits of the case than the tactics and skills of the advocates. Second,
rule of law comprehension and application would seem facilitated by
college education as well. At the least, the college-educated juror
should ordinarily have the benefit of greater comprehension of the
jury instructions. In sum, a predominantly college-educated jury, hav-
ing superior capacity for understanding the relevant facts and law in
complex cases, would render better informed and, thus, more just
verdicts.
Various studies bolster the argument that college-educated jurors
would outperform their less educated counterparts in complex cases.51
The notion of civil juries composed of persons with special education
or skills bearing on complex factual or legal issues has been men-
tioned as a remedy for the perceived incompetence of juries in com-
plex cases. 52 Several commentators have suggested attacking this
problem either by making it harder for the better educated to avoid
jury duty, or by the seating of full or partial blue ribbon juries.53 In a
51. REID HASnE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 135-37 (1983) (showing that jurors with higher
education had superior recall of the judge's instructions and of the facts of the case); JAMES
MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFtLCr 59-100 (1980) (suggesting the superiority of
college-educated jurors in greater and more accurate retention of detail); Robert P. Charrow &
Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury
Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1320 (1979) (finding that college-educated jurors per-
formed better than non-college-educated jurors in ability to comprehend standard jury instruc-
tions); Laurence J. Severance et al., Toward Criminal Jury Instructions that Jurors Can
Understand, 75 J. CRIM. LAw 198, 224 (1984) ("[J]urors with greater experience and learning
apparently comprehend and apply jury instructions better than those who are less experienced
and/or less well educated."); David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A
Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478, 483 (1976) (stating that jurors with college education
scored higher at comprehending the legal principles involved after receiving jury instructions
than those without college experience); F. Strodtbeck et al., Social Status in Jury Deliberations,
22 AMER. Soc. REV. 713 (.1957) (stating that education and occupation are correlates of juror
competence); ABA REPORT, supra note 25, at 25 (finding less educated jurors experienced
greater difficulty with key factual and legal issues in four complex cases). A study currently
being conducted by Northwestern University Law Professor John Casper and Shari Diamond of
the American Bar Foundation finds that jurors with higher education more accurately recalled
complex expert testimony and judicial instructions in an antitrust trial.
52. See, e.g., Drazan, supra note 43; Mark A. Nordenberg & William V. Luneberg, Decision-
making in Complex Federal Civil Cases: Two Alternatives to the Traditional Jury, 65 JUDICATURE
420, 423 (1982) [hereinafter "Nordenberg & Luneberg, Two Alternatives"]; Charles W. Fournier,
Note, The Case for Special Juries in Complex Litigation, 89 YALE L.J. 1155 (1980).
53. Lempert, supra note 50, at 119-21; Luneberg & Nordenberg, supra note 2, at 942-50;
Nordenberg & Luneberg, Two Alternatives, supra note 52, at 421-31.
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widely referenced article, professors Luneberg and Nordenberg advo-
cate that complex civil cases use juries comprised of individuals who
have earned a bachelor's degree from an accredited college or
university.5 4
C. Constitutional Issues
A minimum education requirement (or any other specially qualified
jury measure) would admittedly invite court challenge. For federal
cases, the first impediment would be the 1968 Jury Selection and Ser-
vice Act: "It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in
federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and
petit juries selected at random from a fair cross-section of the commu-
nity.155 In the 1975 case of Taylor v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court
extended the cross-sectional jury ideal to the states, ruling that the
constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury trial required that the
jury pool be a microcosm of the eligible community population.5 6 The
Court justified the new theory as a remedy to the racial discrimination
practiced in the South under existing jury eligibility standards which
permitted systematic exclusion of African-Americans under the guise
of searching for elite jurors.5 7
The plain language of the federal statute and the holding of Taylor
suggest that special juries excluding the less educated might impermis-
sibly eliminate a significant section of the community. Since Taylor,
however, a considerable body of case law interpreting the fair cross-
section requirement indicates otherwise. Explaining Taylor, the
Supreme Court in Duren v. Missouri58 held that a prima facie viola-
tion of the cross-section requirement cannot occur unless: 1) the de-
fendant shows the group alleged to have been excluded forms a
"distinctive" group in the community; 2) the group's under-represen-
tation in the pool from which juries are selected is unfair and unrea-
sonable in relation to the numbers of such persons in the community;
and 3) the under-representation is due to systematic exclusion of the
group.5 9 Although the Court did not define "distinctive," it did recog-
54. Luneberg & Nordenberg, supra note 2, at 945-50; see also Norderberg & Luneberg, Two
Alternatives, supra note 52, at 425-27.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1994).
56. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). The case was decided on Sixth Amendment
grounds. Id. Left unaddressed by the court was whether the Seventh Amendment imposes the
same cross-section requirement in civil cases. But see Colgrove v. Battin, 413 US. 149 (1973)
(appearing to link the Seventh Amendment to the cross-sectional ideal).
57. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530.
58. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
59. Id. at 364-67.
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nize that the states remain free to confine jury selection "to persons
meeting specified qualifications of age and educational attainment. '60
Further, some of the characteristics of a "distinctive" or "cogniza-
ble" group have been identified by the lower courts.61 They have held
that the less educated are not a cognizable group.62 Even if the less
educated were so deemed, no cross-sectional violation would occur
(under the Court's syllogism) unless it was shown that the group was
under-represented in the jury venires in relation to their numbers in
the community.63
The college-educated jury proposal arises out of a conflict between
two legal constraints. One constraint is the cross-sectional require-
ment-seeking a jury representative of the community. Significantly,
the cases behind this requirement were concerned with the discrimina-
tory practice of excluding minorities and others for reasons unrelated
to their competence as jurors.64 The countervailing constraint is the
need for a jury sufficiently competent to reach a fair verdict in com-
plex cases. Courts have stated that there is a due process right to a
competent and rational fact-finder,65 and have recognized that lay ju-
rors may be incapable of deciding complex cases within the spirit of
the Due Process Clause. 66
In complex cases, the college-educated jury would arguably better
fulfill what the Supreme Court has acknowledged to be the purpose of
60. Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970). A lower federal court
observed that it may be acceptable "to impose relevant higher qualifications for service" if a jury
is to perform work of a "special and demanding nature." Quadra v. Superior Court of San
Fransisco, 403 F. Supp. 486, 496 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd. 468 F.2d 1245
(2d Cir. 1972).
There must be a common thread which runs through the group, a basic similarity in
attitudes or ideas ... which cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded
from the jury selection process .... [T]he group must have a community of interests
which cannot be adequately protected by the rest of the populace.
Id. at 143-44.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1977).
The less educated, like the young, are a diverse group, lacking in distinctive characteris-
tics or attitudes which set them apart from the rest of society. They are of varying
economic backgrounds, and races, and of many different ages. We believe the interests
of this group can be adequately protected by the remainder of the populace.
Id. at 905.
63. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
64. See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975) (African-Americans); Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1954) (persons of Mexican lineage); Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S.
217, 220 (1946) (persons earning a daily wage).
65. In re United States Fin. Sec. Lit., 609 F.2d 411, 427 (9th Cir. 1979).
66. Id.; In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Lit., 631 F.2d 1069 (3rd Cir. 1980); Bernstein v.
Universal Pictures Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Lit., 420 F. Supp.
99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
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the trial: "to assure a fair and equitable resolution of factual issues. '67
At the same time, today's population of college graduates represent
virtually every segment of society.6 8 Therefore, the college-educated
juror should not run afoul of the cross-section requirement, especially
if, as discussed below, only part of the final jury panel need satisfy the
proposed minimum education requirement.
D. Preferability to Other Alternatives for Complex Cases
Several other proposals purport to ameliorate the perceived inade-
quacies of the lay jury, particularly in complex civil cases. They can be
grouped into three classifications. In ascending degree of the change
entailed, they are:
1) provide jurors with access to or powers of additional informa-
tion-gathering, e.g., note-taking, asking questions, availability
of a transcript of the testimony and written jury instructions
revised for improved clarity;69
2) use blue ribbon and other expert juries-at least for special
findings of fact,70 and;
3) eliminate juries in complex civil cases.71
All of the suggestions in the first proposal are compatible with the
proposal recommended here, but may be inadequate by themselves.
Although permitted occasionally in the state courts, many of the blue
ribbon juries contemplated in the second proposal more likely violate
the "cross-section of the population" requirement than the educated
jury proposal. 72 In any given case, "college graduates" is broader than
67. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) (citing Gasoline Prod. Co. v. Champlin Co.,
283 U.S. 494 (1931)).
68. An increasingly large number of people have taken advantage of the recent expansion of
opportunities to obtain a college education. See, e.g., ANDERSON, FACT BOOK FOR ACADEMIC
ADmNISTRATORS 148 (1980). By 1994, the number of high school graduates who went to col-
lege reached 62%, compared to 45% in 1960. In 1995, 23% of adults over 24 had completed four
years of college. The State of the Union; Spotlight, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at A12, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File. The trend continues. The percentage of Americans with
college degrees is rising and may reach 40% by 2050. Tom Morgenthau, The Face of the Future,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 27, 1997, at 58, 60.
69. See STRIER, supra note 33, at 236-53 (discussing a taxonomy of proposed reforms in this
area).
70. For a discussion of these and related suggestions, see Peter W. Sperlich, Better Judicial
Management: The Best Remedy for Complex Cases, 65 JUDICATURE 415 (1982); David U.
Strawn & G. Thomas Munsterman, Helping Juries Handle Complex Cases, 65 JUDICATURE 444
(1982).
71. See infra notes 74-87 and accompanying text; see also Redish, supra note 2.
72. Nordenberg & Luneberg, Two Alternatives, supra note 52, at 427.
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"special experts" and, therefore, less likely to constitute a cognizable
group requiring legal protection.73
Clearly the most draconian option is proposal three-outright elim-
ination of juries in complex cases. When the subject matter of litiga-
tion is perceptibly beyond the ken of the jury, some litigants have
sought to circumvent a jury trial (in favor of a bench trial) based on
the requirement presumed by the law: "a jury capable and willing to
decide the case solely on the evidence before it.''74 But these litigants
faced a constitutional impediment in the Seventh Amendment's right
to jury trial in "suits at common law."'75 Hence, any attempt to avoid
a jury trial in such suits would seem to require a constitutional gloss
which permits a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment.
Some federal courts have so interpreted the Constitution.76 Each re-
lied on a footnote in the Supreme Court's decision in Ross v. Bern-
hard.77 In Ross, the Court said: "[T]he 'legal' nature of an issue is
determined [in part] by .. .the practical abilities and limitations of
juries. 78
The Ross footnote suggests an inherent complexity exception when
cases are too complicated to be heard by a jury in a suit at common
law. Put differently, when a case is too complex to be amenable to
jury resolution, there is no remedy "at common law." Therefore, the
only trial remedy is in equity, where there is no right to jury trial. 79
73. See United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901 (9th Cir, 1977); see also Luneberg & Nordenberg,
supra note 2, at 949-51.
74. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).
75. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
76. See, e.g., In re United States Fin. Sec. Lit., 609 F.2d 411(3rd Cir. 1980); Bernstein v. Uni-
versal Pictures, Inc., 77 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Lit,, 420 F. Supp. 99
(W.D. Wash. 1976).
77. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
78. Id. at 538 n. 10 (emphasis added).
79. Language from Alexander Hamilton in the FEDERALIST PAPERS supports this
interpretation:
[T]he circumstances that constitute cases proper for courts of equity are in many in-
stances so... intricate that they are incompatible with the genius of trials by jury. They
require often such long, deliberate, and critical investigation as would be impracticable
to men called from their occupations, and obliged to decide before they were permitted
to return to them. The simplicity and expedition which form the distinguishing charac-
ter of [the jury] mode of trial require that the matter to be decided should be reduced
to some single and obvious point; while the litigations usual in chancery [equity] fre-
quently comprehend a long train of minute and independent particulars. . . . [T~he
attempt to extend the jurisdiction of the courts of law to matters of equity will ... tend
gradually to change the nature of the courts of law and to undermine the trial by jury,
by introducing questions too complicated for a decision in that mode.
THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (1937).
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The Third Circuit took another approach in rejecting a request for
jury trial.80 Rather than looking to the Seventh Amendment, it relied
instead upon the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, guar-
anteeing the right to a fair trial.8' This right is violated, said the court,
when the complexity of the case exceeds the jurors' powers of com-
prehension: "We conclude that due process precludes trial by jury
when a jury is unable to perform this task with a reasonable under-
standing of the evidence and the legal rules."2 Where the amend-
ments ostensibly clash, the court found "the most reasonable
accommodation between the requirements of the Fifth and Seventh
Amendments to be a denial of jury trial. ' 83 Thus, this argument cir-
cumvents the need to find a complexity exception inherent in the Sev-
enth Amendment.84
As science and society progress, many more litigated issues will be
of greater complexity than those contemplated by the drafters of the
Constitution in 1791. In today's complex cases, juries are often de-
monstrably ill-equipped. Antitrust, high-technology patent, securities,
product liability, environmental and medical malpractice litigation are
but a sampling of areas where it is increasingly clear that the apotheo-
sized lay jury is a malfunctioning anachronism.85
Regardless of fine constitutional issues and the associated vagaries
of court interpretation, the educated jury proposal would be prefera-
ble to blue ribbon panels of experts or outright elimination of juries in
complex cases for a symbolic reason: A panel of educated but non-
expert jurors would preserve our heritage of lay participation in the
administration of justice. At the same time, it would preserve the
compelling state interest in ensuring competent fact-finding tribunals
80. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Lit., 631 F.2d 1069, 1080 (3rd Cir. 1980).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1084.
83. Id. at 1086.
84. The issue remains unsettled. The Ninth Circuit refused to interpret the Ross footnote as
the basis for "such a radical departure from its prior interpretation of a constitutional provision
in a footnote." In re United States Fin. Sec. Lit., 609 F.2d 411, 425 (9th Cir. 1979). To date, the
Supreme Court has skirted the issue.
85. See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation Pro-
cess-The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CrN. L. REV. 15, 15-16 (1990) ("The jury has become
part of the national folklore.... [although concerns remain] ... regarding decision-making by
amateurs."). Outside of England (where civil juries have all but been abolished) and the United
States, there are no lay jury parallels with other major industrial countries. That is not to say lay
participation in fact-finding is not valued. In Continental Europe, it is felt that fact-finding is too
important to entrust to a fully lay jury; laymen participate as part of a mixed professional and lay
bench. Karl H. Kunert, Some Observations on the Origin and Structure of Evidence Rules under
the Common Law System and the Criminal Law System of 'Free Proof' in the German Code of
Criminal Procedure, 16 BuFF. L. REV. 122 (1967).
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in complex litigation.8 6 Moreover, only a part of the proposed panel
would need to meet the prescribed minimum education requirements
in order to achieve the projected benefits.8 7
III. THE Los ANGELES JURY SURVEY
A. Prior Research on Educated Jurors
If the proposal offered here is ever to be further evaluated and im-
plemented, more information about the perceptions (and not just the
performance) of educated jurors would be desirable. Yet there is a
dearth of empirical data on educated jurors per se. TWo studies
agreed that more educated jurors tend to participate more and devote
more of their statements to factual and legal issues.8 8 TWo other stud-
ies differed in their findings on the relationship between education
level and tendency to convict.89 Perhaps the greatest commonality
with respect to the findings on the effect of juror education level is
inconclusiveness. 90 Beyond this, there is little empirical background
indicating the trial behavior and post-trial perceptions of educated
jurors.
86. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that this interest may justify the exclusion of a
particular group if "a significant state interest be manifestly and primarily advanced by those
aspects of the jury selection process, such as exemption criteria, that result in the disproportion-
ate exclusion of a distinctive group." Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367-68 (1979). Similarly,
the Court has recognized that the right of parties in complex civil litigation to a jury "suitable in
character and intelligence for that civic duty" should prevail over the objections of those elimi-
nated from jury service in such cases due to lack of education or special experience. Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953).
87. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
88. See Rita James, Status and Competence of Jurors, 64 AM. J. OF Soc. 563 (1959) (noting that
educated jurors received higher ratings from other jurors for their contributions to deliberations,
and were more persuasive in changing other jurors' opinions); see also HASTIE ET AL., supra note
51, at 136 (finding that educated jurors generated more facts, mentioned more issues and noted a
greater number of key fact categories and fact-legal relations).
89. J. P. Reed, Jury Deliberations, Voting and Verdict Trends, Sw. Soc. Sci. Q., 45, 361-70
(noting greater tendency for better educated jurors to convict); A. Sealy & 0. Cornish, Jurors
and Their Verdicts, 36 MOD. L. REv. 496, 496-508 (1973) (discussing education level related to
verdict preference in only one of four cases, where better educated jurors were less likely to
convict).
90. See, e.g., JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 91 (1988) (discussing survey of actual'
jurors tested by education level for various attorney performance factors, results inconclusive);
HASTIE ET. AL, supra note 51, at 136-37 (noting perceptions did not vary as a function of educa-
tion for the following: rating of judge's fairness, the jury's thoroughness, the pressure to change
votes from other jurors, the difficulty of reaching a verdict, confidence that the jury reached a
just verdict, and agreement with the final verdict).
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One fertile source, however, was revealed upon analysis of a broad-
scale survey of Los Angeles jurors (hereinafter "LA Survey"). 91 The
LA survey was conducted over a six-month period during 1987-88.
With over 3800 usable responses, this is the single largest survey of
juror perceptions of the trial process yet conducted in the United
States.92
B. LA Survey Findings
Among the demographic attributes of the polled jurors (age, gen-
der, race, occupation and highest level of education completed), only
the education level produced differences in the reported responses
which were statistically significant. 93 Higher education brought more
91. Franklin Strier, Through the Jurors' Eyes, 74 ABA J. 78 (Oct. 1988) (reporting the general
findings of the unpublished survey); see infra App., Tables 1-7. The data analyzed by demo-
graphic variables have not been widely disseminated.
92. Compare this size with the surveys discussed in supra notes 14-21, 25-30 and accompany-
ing text. All surveys of juror perceptions have some limitations. They report self-assessments,
for example, not actual objective understanding. Regarding evaluation of attorney performance,
it is not certain whether juror perceptions of attorney intent correspond with reality. Neverthe-
less, the data have utility, particularly when considered with converging evidence. Thus, several
respectable studies have tested juror self-perceptions. See generally JOE CECIL, ALLEN LIND &
GORDON BERMANT, JURY SERVICE IN LENGTHY CIVIL TRIALS (1987) (reporting a study by the
Federal Judicial Center on how jurors' perceptions were affected by service in lengthy federal
civil cases); GUINTHER, supra note 90 (discussing survey of actual jurors tested by education
level for various attorney performance factors).
The Los Angeles Jury Survey is unique and valuable because of its size, its use of actual trials
(instead of mock simulations) and the breath of its coverage. For results of this unpublished
survey see Tables 1-7 of Appendix; see generally Strier, supra note 91 (reporting the general
findings of the survey). The study covered a wide range of juror perceptions and attitudes.
More intensive, narrowly-focused research is encouraged to test the implications of the data and
the feasibility of the educated juror proposal. In cooperation with the Los Angeles Juror Serv-
ices Division, exiting jurors at all 12 Los Angeles Superior Courts answered the survey question-
naire. Each court's jury supervisor gave the questionnaire to the jurors at the conclusion of their
tours of duty. The questionnaire contained 16 closed-ended questions within five sections. The
first section requested demographic information, and asked whether the juror served on a crimi-
nal or civil case. The second section, "Pre-Trial Activity," dealt exclusively with jury selection.
All 3830 respondents were free to answer the questions in these two sections. Only the 2533
individuals actually selected to serve on juries were instructed to answer the balance of the ques-
tionnaire. (Thus the survey sample drops to 2533 for the balance of the questions.) The last
three sections were "Trial Procedures and Practices," "Judge Instructions" and "Jury Delibera-
tion." The final question was open-ended, inviting any comments or suggestions relevant to the
inquiry. Closed-ended responses were computer-tabulated using Statistical Package Social
Sciences.
93. Chi-square analysis was used to measure the relatedness of education to psychological
variables formed during jury duty. Jurors were asked to respond to statements in the survey
questionnaire. Responses were measured with a five-point Likert-type scale: strongly agree,
agree, no opinion, disagree, and strongly disagree. For the purpose of evaluating results, the
Likert-type response categories "strongly agree" and "strongly disagree" were collapsed into
"agreed" and "disagreed," respectively; the third response group is "no opinion." Respondent
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moderation in the responses and more confidence in the propriety and
utility of the evidence presentation procedure. 94 College-educated ju-
rors reported greater comprehension of the jury instructions and less
need to reorder the evidence in order to make it clearer. 95 They also
perceived more attorney attempts at evidence distortion, yet were
more confident that mismatched attorney skills did not have a signifi-
cant effect on jury decision-making and the jury deliberation pro-
cess. 96 Further, on every question, jurors' likelihood of taking a stand
and expressing an opinion on the statements and questions presented
to them increased with their education. 97
1. Comprehension-related Issues
a. Judge's Instructions
Perceived comprehension of the judge's instructions was tested by
two questions, one specific and one general.98 Differences by educa-
tion level were especially pronounced in response to a specific inquiry
regarding the number of words, terms and concepts the jurors found
difficult to understand. (See Table 1.) The general question asked
whether the instructions were sufficiently comprehensible to apply to
the evidence.99 Once more, the survey found a correspondence be-
tween education and the utility of the instructions. (See Table 2.) The
results confirm an earlier study suggesting that higher levels of educa-
tion result in superior understanding and application of jury
instructions. 100
b. Reordering Evidence Presentation
Jurors were asked to respond to suggestions for making the evi-
dence "clearer to and more effectively judged by the jury."''1 1 (See
Table 3.) One of the suggestions was to reorder the proceedings so
that all of the evidence on the same subject was presented at the same
jurors were classified into five educational categories: less than high school, high school, some
college, undergraduate degree completed, graduate degree.
94. Infra App., Tables 6 & 7.
95. Infra App., Tables 1 & 3.
96. Infra App., Tables 4 & 5.
97. See infra App., Tables 1-7; see generally Strier, supra note 91 (reporting the general find-
ings of the survey).
98. Infra App., Tables 1 & 2.
99. Infra App., Table 2.
100. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 51, at 1320.
101. Infra App., Table 3.
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time. Only those without a college education showed a marked pref-
erence for this proposal. 02
Processing fragmented information is a skill one ordinarily must
bring to or acquire in college in order to succeed. In elementary and
high school pedagogy, information is fed to students in neatly pack-
aged bundles; typically, a palpable thread runs through the informa-
tion given the students. Conversely, information in college instruction
is often desultorily presented, so that the instructor can ask the stu-
dents to find the common thread as a heuristic exercise.
In similar fashion, the trial attorney is free to present evidence in
any order, however scattered, that he or she feels most effectively re-
dounds to the client's benefit. The college-educated juror may feel
less need than lesser educated counterparts to simplify this presenta-
tion process because a college education probably fostered and honed
the skills employed in synthesizing diffuse evidentiary information.
By the same token, the less educated juror may be overwhelmed by
the task.
2. Attorney Performance Issues
The LA Survey also polled jurors on issues related to the adver-
sarial presentation of issues.10 3 The findings suggest that jurors with
different education levels perceive and respond to adversarial presen-
tation differently. 1°4
a. Attorney Trial Tactics
As their education increased, jurors were more likely to feel that
one or both attorneys had tried to distort or hide facts from the jury.
(See Table 4.) College-educated jurors were thus more likely to see
an overstepping of "lines of propriety" with respect to attorney trial
practices. College or post-graduate courses in ethics, philosophy or
law may have sensitized them to this distinction. As neither juror ori-
entation programs nor jury instructions address the boundaries of at-
torney tactical discretion, additional formal education could be the
source of this perceptual disparity.
102. Id.
103. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
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b. Mismatched Attorney Skills
Two survey questions probed the impact of perceived mismatched
attorney skills on juror decision-making. 10 5 At first blush, the re-
sponses to the two question statements on this topic may seem incon-
sistent: Further analysis yields a reconciliation.
College-educated jurors were less likely to think that mismatched
attorney skills affected the verdict of the case on which they served. 10 6
(See Table 5.) Yet when asked in the next question whether an attor-
ney skill mismatch was either partially, primarily or completely re-
sponsible for a wrong decision, a higher percentage of the more
educated actually found some responsibility, i.e., a causal relationship
between the perceived skills mismatch and a wrong decision. (See Ta-
ble 6.) A possible reason for this apparent inconsistency lies in the
fact that the degree of responsibility varied markedly by education.
College-educated jurors were far more likely to find only partial re-
sponsibility, i.e., a moderate response. Less educated jurors tended to
have polar, extreme reactions; they were more likely to perceive mis-
matched attorney skills having either no effect or significant (primary
or complete responsibility) effect.
These results suggest the following characterizations of the more
educated juror with regards to attorney performance. This juror is
more likely to perceive attorney mischief. Yet the juror is also more
confident and less likely to believe that observed mismatched attorney
skills significantly affected the jury's decision-making, adversely or
otherwise. To the extent that perceptions reflect reality, educated ju-
rors may also be better at: a) sensing and discounting attorney trial
tactics designed to corrupt rather than inform the judgment of the ju-
rors, and b) resisting the potential biasing effect (discussed above)
when the opposing attorneys are substantially mismatched. 10 7
105. Infra App., Tables 5 & 6.
106. Thirty-five percent of all respondents agreed with the statement that mismatched attor-
ney skills probably affected the verdict. Infra App., Table 5. No attempt was made to determine
the extent of perceived disparity of attorney skills without regard to effect on outcome. (Indeed,
this may be a fruitful source of further study.) The percentage believing mismatched attorney
skills affected the verdict may be deceptively low because it represents a subset of a subset, i.e.,
those who believed both that the attorneys were mismatched and that the mismatch affected the
verdict. If we assume that those disagreeing with the statement were evenly divided among
those who a) perceived no mismatch, b) perceived no effect on verdict, or c) perceived neither,
then most of those who did perceive a mismatch also thought it affected the verdict. In fact, over
half (56%) of the respondents felt that mismatched attorneys "can" affect the outcome. Strier,
supra note 91, at 80.
107. This is admittedly speculative. Note the other possible interpretations of the findings: a)
the perceptions of the educated jurors were wrong, and thus of no value in enhancing fact-
finding or discounting the effect of mismatched attorneys, and b) the perceptions were correct,
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Several possible and compatible explanations can be offered as to
why college education would better prepare one to perform the ju-
ror's role less influenced by attorney tactics and mismatched attorney
skills. One explanation looks to the content of college courses. Tradi-
tional curricula expose students to numerous illustrations of superla-
tive polemicists who swayed others by emotional appeals rather than
the substance of their arguments. This is the lesson from history, soci-
ology, philosophy, political science, psychology and other courses in
the baccalaureate program. Further, college graduates have typically
taken courses in math, economics and physical and natural science,
the very subjects which frequently give jurors difficulty in complex
cases, particularly when attorneys try to mislead them regarding the
evidence. 08
Not to be overlooked, however, is the discipline gained by learning
from any lecture. Students can rarely devote full attention for an en-
tire class. Instead, they must learn to selectively focus when critical
material is being discussed, and relax their concentration at other
times. The juror's role is analogous. During evidence presentation in
lengthy, complex cases, when juror lapses of attention are notoriously
commonplace, the college graduates' conditioning should better pre-
pare them to focus on critical testimony, rather than on oratorical
flourish and attorney diversions.
The college experience arguably makes the student more educable
as well.1O9 Juxtaposing the college student's learning process with the
juror's courtroom experience reveals clear parallels. In both capaci-
ties, the individual must seek to understand and apply new concepts of
varying difficulties. Both present most of the material verbally, sup-
plemented occasionally with visual aids.
3. Jury Deliberations
In addition to reactions to the attorneys' performance and judge's
instructions, the study also sought the jurors' reactions to their own
performance. Specifically, they were asked if they thought their deci-
sion-making process, as a jury, was in any way faulty or improper. 1 0
The college educated expressed more confidence in the soundness and
propriety of their jury's decision-making process. (See Table 7.)
but i) this does not necessarily translate to improved fact-finding, and/or ii) educated jurors
overcompensated for perceived mismatching. Nevertheless, this set of data still provides a valua-
ble profile of the educated juror given the size and breath of the survey sample.
108. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
109. See ROBERT MiLLs GAGNE, THE CONDmONS OF LEARN NG 333-34 (2d ed. 1970).
110. Infra App., Table 7.
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Inasmuch as juror orientation is the same for all jurors, disparity of
formal education may bear upon the perception of proper jury deci-
sion-making. Other studies found that better educated jurors partici-
pated more actively during jury deliberation, and also gave more
attention to procedural matters than did the lesser educated."' Intel-
lectual investment in a decisional activity can certainly imbue the par-
ticipant with a greater sense of its correctness. If the college-educated
jurors indeed played more active roles in jury deliberation, it is easy to
see how they would have a higher regard for the validity of that deci-
sion-making process.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PROPOSAL
As with any other proposal, theory must be supported by guidelines
for implementation. Before it can be operationalized, four distinct as-
pects of the educated jury proposal invite attention: increasing the
availability of college-educated jurors; better defining the "complex"
cases targeted by the proposal; establishing the ideal higher educated
component of the proposed educated jury; and developing a rough
blueprint for selecting the educated jury. These issues are addressed
below.
A. Increasing the Availability of Educated Jurors
Prospective jurors with college educations often do not serve on ju-
ries hearing complex cases because they are struck from jury panels.
Evidence suggests that trial attorneys use their peremptory challenges
to exclude such jurors. 112 Attorneys may fear that educated jurors will
see through a weak case or use their education to sway other jurors.
In addition to peremptory challenges, educated professionals are
frequently excused from service on complex cases by making claims of
financial sacrifice. Complex cases tend to be long. Professionals often
cannot afford (or their employers will not abide) jury service on pro-
tracted cases. Consequently, courts frequently excuse them upon a
showing of undue hardship or extreme inconvenience." 3 The hard-
111. See, e.g., James, supra note 88, at 563-70.
112. Ell, supra note 5, at 780-81; see also Frederick P. Furth & Robert Emmett Bums, The
Anatomy of a Seventy Million Dollar Sherman Act Settlement-A Law Professor's Tape-Talk
with Plaintiff's Trial Counsel, 23 DEPAUL L. REv. 865, 880-81 (1974) (discussing claim by trial
attorney that, in an antitrust case, defense counsel is more likely than plaintiff counsel to chal-
lenge the inclusion of educated persons on the jury).
113. United States v. Armsbury, 408 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (D. Or. 1976) (noting that excusals
based on extreme inconvenience or undue hardship are allowable, even if they result in under-
representations of certain cognizable groups); see also Rita Sutton, A More Rational Approach
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ship results from the projected loss of pay over a lengthier trial. 114
Collectively, these two practices combine to seriously suppress the
percentage of persons with higher education who serve on juries in
complex cases.115
Several steps might reverse this phenomenon and increase the avail-
ability of educated jurors. Compensation for jury service in most state
courts is pathetically low-California's five dollars per day, for exam-
ple. The most obvious remedy is to substantially increase juror com-
pensation: It would take $60 per day just to compensate a worker
making only $15,000 per year. Necessary additional funds can come
from any of three sources: the state, the juror's employer or the liti-
gants. Some states are responding with state funds and mandated em-
ployer payments. Massachusetts, Colorado and Connecticut require
employers to cover the first three days of jury service, and then the
court pays $50 per day.1 6 The California Blue Ribbon Commission
on Jury System Improvements (hereinafter "California Commission")
has called on the state legislature to increase juror fees to $40 each
day of jury service after the first day and $50 per day for each day of
jury service after the thirtieth day." 7 In addition, the California Com-
mission recommended that employers continue paying usual compen-
sation and benefits for the first three days of jury service if the
employee has given reasonable notice to the employer of the service
requirement." 8 As an incentive to employers, the California Com-
mission also recommended that the legislature adopt reasonable tax
credits for employers who continue paying usual compensation and
benefits to employees absent for more than three days because of jury
service.119 Federal and state governments can make the increased ju-
ror fees even more attractive by granting them non-taxable status.
to Complex Civil Litigation in the Federal Courts: The Special Jury, 1990 U. CI. LEGAL F. 575,
578.
114. Most employers will not unqualifiedly pay jurors during their jury service regardless of
service length. Some do not pay at all; many will only pay for a prescribed period such as three
or five days. A September 1994 Los Angeles Times poll of Los Angeles County's working eligi-
ble jurors found 37% said their employers do not pay for jury service, 37% said they would pay
and 22% did not know. STATE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, JURY REFORM 9 (1995) (on file
with DePaul Law Review).
115. Sutton, supra note 113, at 577-78; see also SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGfrrS-
MAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 125 (1988).
116. STATE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, supra note 114, at 10.
117. J. CLARK KELSO, FINAL REPORT OF BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON JURY SYSTEM IM-
PROVEMENT 42 (1996) (on file with DePaul Law Review).
118. Id. at 43.
119. Id. at 43-44.
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Another alternative requires the litigants, as opposed to the em-
ployers, to bear the additional juror fees paid for cases lasting beyond
a few days. 20 This has been ordered in at least one case. 121 Obvi-
ously, this would discriminate against litigants less able to afford the
additional fees. A sliding scale or some other fee schedule based on
ability to pay would moderate the impact.
A different but compatible approach to the hardship problem is to
reduce trial time. Means to this end include imposing deadlines on
the parties for the presentation of evidence, allowing jurors to take
exhibits, videotaped depositions and other evidence to view at home
over a weekend, 22 and segregating discrete issues for trial by different
juries.123 Scheduling trials after working hours would also enhance
the availability of highly-paid individuals. 24
A direct solution is also available to the problem of deselection,
where attorneys intentionally exclude well educated jurors. Mitigat-
ing or eliminating peremptory challenges in complex cases would
greatly curtail this practice. Trial attorneys, of course, would de-
nounce any such encroachment upon their perceived prerogatives.
The call for reducing peremptories has been debated in many
quarters. 125 Ultimately, it remains for trial procedure policy-makers
to weigh all the perceived advantages of reducing or eliminating per-
emptories, including curtailing the deselection of educated jurors,
against the projected disadvantages claimed by trial attorneys and
other supporters of the present practice. Even if peremptories were
reduced or eliminated, attorneys would retain the right to unlimited
challenges for cause. Additionally, judges might adopt a more expan-
sive view of the challenge for cause.
B. Defining "Complex" Cases
Although widely discussed in cases and articles, there is no consen-
sus on exactly what constitutes a "complex" case. A case's complexity
is a function of its length and/or subject matter.126 Modern trials can
present any or all of three cognitive problems for jurors: too long, too
120. See Lempert, supra note 50, at 118-19.
121. In what may be the first instance of parties contributing to juror pay, a Texas judge or-
dered jurors be paid $50 per day-$44 from the parties. Kate Thomas, Texas Judge Tells Parties:
Pay Jurors, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 9, 1996, at A7.
122. Stephan A. Saltzburg, Improving the Quality of Jury Decisionmaking, in VERDIcr, supra
note 31, at 351.
123. Id. at 350-51.
124. Id. at 351.
125. For a discussion of the pros and cons, see KELSO, supra note 117, at 53-64.
126. Lempert, supra note 31, at 183.
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complicated or too technical. A jury may be able to recall all of the
witnesses in a burglary case, but surely cannot be expected to resolve
the conflicts in the testimony of one hundred witnesses in an antitrust
case. A California murder trial amply demonstrates the plight of ju-
rors.127 After twenty-two days of deliberation, the jurors appeared
deadlocked.' 28 They passed a note to the judge stating their inability
to arrive at a unanimous decision.' 29 Seeking to avoid a mistrial, the
judge offered to have any or all of the testimony read back to the
jurors.' 30 The jurors agreed to listen to a complete reading of the tes-
timony of two key witnesses, which took about seven days-over
1,000 pages in all.13'
Complex cases test the compartmentalization and logical ordering
skills of most jurors beyond their capacities. Jurors tend to confuse
evidence in trials involving multiple parties, causes of action, or of-
fenses.132 As a result, they may use evidence admitted on one issue to
resolve other issues. 33
But the type of trial most beyond the comprehension of the average
juror is one containing scientific or other technically-specific issues.
For example, cases in which the issues relate to statutory securities
law, patent infringement or medical malpractice often implicate mat-
ters that only lawyers, scientists or medical doctors, respectively, could
satisfactorily appreciate. And how well can unsophisticated jurors sit-
ting in a complicated shareholder derivative action determine whether
a challenged business practice is improper on the basis of conflicting
expert testimony?
Courts should acknowledge realistic limitations of average juror
competence in cases involving lengthy, complicated or technical facts
or legal issues. Tests or guidelines can be developed to help decide
when a major trial issue is probably of sufficient complexity as to re-
quire a higher level of competence for its resolution.' 34 For example,
whenever a litigant indicates an expert in a technical field will be
called as a witness, and that witness' testimony will be material, it
could create a rebuttable presumption of complexity. In establishing
127. G.M. Bush, Maniscalco Jurors Seek Second Reading of Key Testimony, L.A. DAILY J.,
Oct. 30, 1990, at 2.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of
Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C. L. Rav. 741, 750 (1988).
133. Id.
134. Ell, supra note 5, at 798.
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these parameters, courts and court commissions would be wise to
work with psychologists and other behavioral scientists. These profes-
sionals can supply the relevant empirical findings and current theory
necessary for informed development of guidelines.
Whatever guidelines are used, once a case is designated "complex"
by the court it should become eligible to be heard by a special jury
with a minimum number of college-educated jurors. The court can
order its impanelment if both parties so stipulate. If not, the judge can
rule on the motion of either party.
C. Composing the Educated Jury
Even if judges and procedural policymakers acknowledge the need
for more educated jurors in complex cases, legal and political issues
would still impede adoption. Courts must rule that this particular spe-
cial jury does not contravene the cross-section requirement, 135 and the
body politic would have to believe that the projected benefits out-
weigh the potential diminution of jury representativeness. For each
impasse, the same dynamic would obtain: the less specialized the jury,
the more acceptable to the courts and the public.
Key to the appeal of this proposal is that only some of the jury
members would have to hold a degree from an accredited college.
The research of Hastie et al., demonstrated that while individual edu-
cated jurors generate more issues and discuss more fact/law relation-
ships, only a few such jurors on any jury raise the performance of the
entire jury.136 Jurors in the study were distributed so that the average
level of education in each jury was kept uniform. 137 Differences in
performance across juries were not impressive. 138 Similarly, another
jury study found that the ablest jurors of each jury helped the other
jurors understand the evidence and legal rules while guiding the
deliberations. 139
Given the uncertain legal and political environment for acceptance
of this reform, the ideal college-educated component of the proposed
special jury would be the lowest .number (or fraction) generally neces-
sary to obtain the desired advantages. As noted above, research indi-
cates it is unnecessary to require all or even nearly all of the jurors to
135. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
136. See generally HASTIE ET AL, supra note 51 (showing that jurors with higher educations
were better able to understand the law and facts of the case).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. ABA REPORT, supra note 25, at 22.
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be college educated.140 Yet one or two, though possibly sufficient in
any given case, would probably be unreliable in most cases. There-
fore, this Article proposes half of the jury as an initial, and admittedly
tentative, baseline fraction. Accompanying this proposal, however, is
an exhortation for further research in this area so that, given the "low-
est number necessary" criterion, commensurate refinements to the
minimum college education component can be made in the future.
D. Selecting the Educated Jurors
Judge William Schwarzer describes two procedures for selecting
specially qualified jurors in complex cases. 14' The first permits each
attorney to choose a given number of potential jurors following voir
dire.' 42 Specifically, each side would exercise challenges for cause and
peremptory challenges against jurors chosen by the other side.143
Each attorney would then select one-half of the required jurors and
alternates from those remaining.'" The jury is thus entirely com-
posed of jurors selected by each side. Any side that desired a more
educated or otherwise specially-qualified jury is thus ensured of se-
lecting half of the jury with that qualification. 145
Schwarzer's alternate procedure shifts responsibility for selection to
the judge.' 46 Following voir dire, the judge would select the requisite
number of prospective jurors based on their education and discuss this
list with counsel' 47 After considering counsels' comments and ruling
on their challenges, the judge would seat the jury that had been
selected.' 48
A proposal outlined by professors Luneberg and Nordenberg relies
on a questionnaire to identify prospective jurors with a bachelor's de-
gree from an accredited college or university. 49 These names are
placed in a jury wheel of qualified prospective jurors from which a
jury commissioner or court clerk selects.'50 This would be the sim-
plest and least costly method to administer. As with Schwarzer's al-
140. See supra notes 51-87 and accompanying text.
141. Schwarzer, supra note 50, at 580-81.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Luneberg & Nordenberg, supra note 2, at 942-50.
150. Id. at 946.
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ternate procedure, it would remove the attorneys from the selection
procedure.
Another alternative would require that upon the motion of either
party to a complex case, the judge would make a determination of the
suitability of a specially-qualified jury.151 If so, the jury would be se-
lected in either of two ways. First, the judge could make the choice
from persons randomly selected from a master jury wheel using infor-
mation from a questionnaire similar to the Luneberg and Nordenberg
proposal. The value of this method of selection is that the demo-
graphic information the questionnaire supplies can be used to create
jury pools which still reflect a representative cross-section of the com-
munity.152 Alternatively, the selection could be made by a three-per-
son committee comprised of one representative from each side, plus a
neutral.153
It would betray both ignorance and presumptuousness to prescribe
one selection method over another when there has been only the
barest of experience with any method. To do so might foreclose po-
tentially valuable experience for the sake of appearing authoritative.
TWo procedures are recommended, however, regardless of the method
chosen. First, questionnaire information to offset the potential loss of
representativeness can be inestimable and should be utilized. Second,
the number of educated jurors to be specially selected should be re-
duced on a one-for-one basis by the number of qualified educated ju-
rors which would have been coincidentally chosen in the normal
manner. In this way, any compromise of the random selection and
diversity underlying the cross-section rule would be limited to no
greater than necessary.
The latter procedure could work as follows. One-half of the jurors
in a complex case would first be chosen by conventional means. In
the unlikely event that they all meet the minimum education require-
ment, the balance of the jury would be selected without any special
selection necessary. But where one or more of this first half did not
meet the minimum education requirement, additional jurors would be
chosen in the conventional manner only until the deficiency in the
minimum component of educated jurors equaled the remaining
number of vacancies. At that point all the remaining jurors would
have to be specially selected from a list of prospective jurors with the
151. Fournier, supra note 52, at 1172.
152. See id. at 1172-76.
153. Id. at 1174-76.
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necessary education. 54 Assume, for example, two of the first six ju-
rors conventionally chosen (in what was to be a twelve person jury)
had college degrees from accredited schools. Two more could be cho-
sen in the same standard way before reverting to any special selection
procedure. Assuming neither of the next two selected jurors were col-
lege graduates, the jury would be completed by choosing four addi-
tional educated jurors through the special procedure.
CONCLUSION
The jury's role is central to our justice delivery system. Continued
public deference for jury decision-making cannot be understated. So-
ciety risks losing that vital support if it does not recognize the clear
limitations of juries in modem complex litigation. By applying a func-
tional approach to restructuring the jury in apt situations, the courts
can meet the current challenge and preserve the institution of jury
trial.
Mandating that half of the members of every jury in complex cases
be college graduates could effect a significant improvement of the jury
system. A panel so constituted would increase the probability of ob-
taining a more competent jury without resort to nonrepresentative or
less representative expert panels. Further research should inform and
refine this proposal so that the desired benefit is achieved with mini-
mum deviation from conventional jury selection procedures.
154. If none of the first half selected had the minimum education required, then all of the
second half would have to be specially selected.
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APPENDIX:
LA SURVEY TABLES 15 5
TABLE 1
JUDGE'S INSTRUCTIONS--SPECIFIC
[Vol. 47:49
Chi-square Analysis: Comparison of Responses to the Question "In the judges instructions, how
many words, terms or concepts did you have difficulty understanding?"
(By level of education)
More
1 to 5 6 to 10 than 10
None Words Words Words TOTAL
N % N % N % N % N %
Jurors with less than
high school 35 59 16 27 3 5 5 9 59 100
Jurors with high school
diploma 292 63 138 30 23 5 12 2 465 100
Jurors with some college 602 64 298 31 31 3 18 2 949 100
Jurors with under-
graduate degrees 343 64 178 33 10 2 5 1 536 100
Jurors with graduate
degrees 245 75 71 22 5 2 4 1 325 100
TOTALS 1517 701 72 44 2334
X2=45.60; DF=12; P<.05
TABLE 2
JUDGE'S INSTRUCTIONS-GENERAL
Chi-square Analysis: Comparison of Responses to the Statement "Overall, the judges instruc-
tions were sufficiently understandable to apply them to our findings of
fact." (By level of education)
DISAGREE
AGREE (Not NO
(Understandable) Understandable) OPINION TOTAL
N % N % N % N %
Jurors with less than high
school 49 86 2 4 6 10 57 100
Jurors with high school
diploma 416 90 18 4 28 6 462 100
Jurors with some college 850 90 42 4 53 6 945 100
Jurors with undergrad-
uate degrees 485 92 29 5 14 3 528 100
Jurors with graduate
degrees 305 95 11 3 6 2 322 100
TOTALS 2105 102 107 2314
X2=21.45; df=8;
p<.05
155. All data is derived from the unpublished LA Survey, supra notes 91-93.
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TABLE 4
ATTORNEY TRIAL TACTICS
[Vol. 47:49
Chi-square Analysis: Comparison of Response to the Statement "At times, I felt one or both
attorneys were trying more to distort or selectively hide facts rather than
seeking to reveal the truth so the jury could make an informed judgment."
(By level of education)
AGREE DISAGREE
(Perceived (Lack of NO
Distortion) Distortion) OPINION TOTAL
N % N % N % N %
Jurors with less than high school 15 25 30 51 14 24 59 100
Jurors with high school diploma 126 27 229 49 111 24 466 100
Jurors with some college 287 30 481 51 182 19 950 100
Jurors with undergraduate
degrees 178 34 257 49 92 17 527 100
Jurors with graduate degrees 104 32 176 54 47 14 327 100
TOTALS 710 1173 446 2329
X2=16.23; df=8; p<.05
TABLE 5
MISMATCHED ATTORNEY SKILLS-AFFECTING VERDICT
Chi-square Analysis: Comparison of Response to the Statement "The difference in courtroom
skills between the attorneys probably affected the verdict." (By level of
education)
AGREE DISAGREE
(Verdict (No NO
Impact) Impact) OPINION TOTAL
N % N % N % N %
Jurors with less than high school 14 25 22 39 20 36 56 100
Jurors with high school diploma 126 28 213 47 118 25 457 100
Jurors with some college 260 28 450 49 210 23 920 100
Jurors with undergraduate
degrees 130 25 285 55 106 20 521 100
Jurors with graduate degrees 91 28 178 56 504 16 319 100
TOTALS 621 1148 504 2273
X2=22.90; df=8; p<.05
1997]
Chi-square Analysis: Comparison of Response to the Statement "If you think the jury reached
any wrong decisions-with respect to either the verdict, size of the award
or length or sentence-to what extent was the difference in courtroom
skills between the attorneys responsible?" (By level of education)
Significant Partial NO
Effect Effect Effect TOTAL
N % N % N % N %
Jurors with less than high school 4 13 6 19 21 68 31 100
Jurors with high school diploma 25 16 27 18 100 66 152 100
Jurors with some college 31 10 68 23 202 67 301 100
Jurors with undergraduate degrees 16 9 60 32 109 59 185 100
Jurors with graduate degrees 7 7 36 36 56 57 99 100
TOTALS 83 197 488 768
X2=21.94; df=8; p<.05
TABLE 7
JURY DELIBERATIONS
Chi-square Analysis: Comparison of Response to the Statement "I believe some part of the
jury's decision-making process was faulty or improper." (By level of edu-
cation)
AGREE DISAGREE
(Faulty/ (Not faulty/ NO
Improper) Proper) OPINION TOTAL
N % N % N % N %
Jurors with less than high school 16 26 29 48 16 26 61 100
Jurors with high school diploma 78 28 254 57 114 25 446 100
Jurors with some college 181 20 518 58 190 22 889 100
Jurors with undergraduate
degrees 79 16 313 62 112 22 504 100
Jurors with graduate degrees 53 17 196 65 85 18 334 100
TOTALS 407 1310 517 2234
X2=15.59; df=8; p<.05
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TABLE 6
MISMATCHED ATTORNEY SKILLS-CONTRIBUTING TO
WRONG DECISION
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